INTRODUCTION
Fully autonomous robotic weapons permeate our militaries.
2 This technology is percolating into the private sector, yielding robotic weapons capable of defending both ourselves and our homes. 3 As this technology continues to advance, many people will choose to defend themselves not by guns, but by robots.
This prompts a constitutional question: are robotic weapons "Arms" under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution? 4 Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution has already posed this "very real" question, 5 and this article is the first to contemplate an answer. 6 In is better interpreted as not requiring that arms be wearable, 15 and that the Second Amendment does not support such a requirement. 16 Doctrinally, scrutinizing Heller reveals that the Court did not intend to establish a wearability requirement for arms. 17 Further, Heller's core holding-that the Second Amendment protects the right of armed selfdefense-suggests that arms should be defined by that self-defense principle, not by a weapon's physical attributes. 18 Next, this article argues that the Second Amendment's text and history does not support a requirement that arms be wearable. The Second Amendment's original public meaning, the starting point for determining the Amendment's scope, according to Heller, 19 is equivocal at best on this point. 20 Even if we choose to credit the original meanings supporting the wearability requirement, we still must "translate" them. 21 That is, the original public meaning may have been that arms must be wearable, but the impetus for this meaning was not because wearability is the sine qua non of defining arms. It was because, at the time, only wearable weapons were useful for self-defense. 22 Thus, translating the Second Amendment's original meaning to modern times would require that the weapon be useful for self-defense, which robotic weapons are, and not that the weapon be wearable.
As for the fourth constitutional ground, a wearability requirement is imprudent. Such a requirement would categorically exclude robotic weapons from the scope of the Second Amendment, even though they are, or will soon be, a more effective and safer method of self-defense than weapons currently protected by the Amendment. Further, allowing non-wearable weapons to be arms does not expand constitutional protection to inordinately destructive weapons, likes bombs or tanks, because other aspects of Second Amendment doctrine independently exclude them. 23 In addition to arguing that arms need not be wearable, this article considers two other aspects relating to a Second Amendment right to robotic weapons. First, it contemplates whether robotic weapons satisfy the doctrinal definition of arms-whether they are weapons in common use for lawful purposes like self-defense. 24 Robotic weapons currently satisfy two aspects of this definition: they are weapons, and they are legitimately used for self-defense. 25 However, they are not yet in common use, and there are questions over whether robotic weapons can even be lawful self-defense, though this article speculates that they can. 26 Second, this article considers an alternative path to protecting robotic weapons under the Second Amendment: auxiliary rights. Auxiliary rights extend beyond the core constitutional right to "ensure that the core right is genuinely protected." 27 The Seventh Circuit recently recognized a Second Amendment auxiliary right extending protection to firing ranges because they enable one to better defend herself. 28 These rights arguably also extend Second Amendment protection to certain robotic weapons for the same reason. 29 This article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a primer on robotic weapons. Part II introduces Heller's definition of arms, apart from the alleged wearability requirement, and applies that to robotic weapons. Part III discusses whether arms must be wearable and argues that they need not be. Part IV presents the possibility of a Second Amendment auxiliary right to certain robotic weapons. Part V concludes the article.
I. ROBOTICS PRIMER
Robotics is the next transformative technology. 30 They "are widely used in manufacturing, warfare, and disaster response, and the market for personal robotics is exploding." 31 Generally defined, a robot is any powered machine that senses, thinks, and acts. 32 [t] here is no universally accepted definition of what exactly constitutes a 'robot'" and defining robots for the purposes of the study as "a cyberphysical system with sensors, actuators, and mobility").
31. Calo, supra note 30, at 571. See generally supra note 30. 32. See SINGER, supra note 30, at 67; see also LIN, BEKEY & ABNEY, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that a robot is " [a] powered machine that (1) senses, (2) thinks (in a focuses on only those robotic weapons capable of making autonomous firing decisions, as in firing without a person's prompting. 33 This primer is also limited to robots that would be the most useful for self-defense, thus omitting, for instance, discussions of autonomous aircraft. 34 Armed robots making autonomous firing decisions already exist in the battlefield. 35 The U.S. military currently employs at least two: the Navy's Phalanx Close-In Weapon System and the Army's Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar System. 36 Both have essentially the same function of targeting and destroying incoming missiles. 37 Armed with a large caliber, rapid-fire gun, 38 these robots "automatically perform[] search, detecting, tracking, threat evaluation, firing, and kill-assessments deliberative, non-mechanical sense), and (3) acts") (emphasis removed). More specifically, a robot is a powered machine that "monitor[s] the environment and detect [s] changes in it [,] . . . decide [s] how to respond [,] . . . and [employs] 'effectors' that act on the environment in a manner that reflects the decisions, creating some sort of change in the world. . . ." See SINGER, supra note 30, at 67. 33. This article focuses on autonomously firing robots to illuminate just how advanced current robots are in that autonomous robotic sentries are not futuristic speculation, but instead an imminent reality. Technologically, it is easier to build robots that act solely upon human direction, like the already-existing Air Force aerial drones, than one that acts autonomously, which the Air Force expects will not be possible for aircrafts until 2047. See infra note 34. Doctrinally, the extent of autonomy is relevant only in the analysis of whether employing a robotic weapon is lawful self-defense. In Korea, the specific robot employed is Samsung's SGR-A1. 44 The robot is stationary, with a height and weight of roughly four feet and 258 pounds, and is equipped with a machine gun. 45 The robot uses vision sensors, along with a voice recognition system, to identify incoming persons. 46 If the person is not recognized and cannot provide necessary access codes, the robot can "verbally command [her] to surrender," "sound an alarm, fire rubber bullets," or fire real bullets. 47 The robot can autonomously decide to fire its weapon 48 but will choose not to fire when a person surrenders to it. 49 In addition to autonomously firing, the robot can shoot upon a person's command.
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In contrast to the soldierly nature of these military robots, most personal robots today are servile. While the former can, without human 39. LIN, BEKEY & ABNEY, supra note 6, at 18-19 (also stating that the Navy's weapon "uses radar sensing of approaching missiles, identifies targets, tracks targets, makes the decision to fire, and then fires its guns, using solid tungsten bullets to penetrate the approaching target"); see also 59. See Kumagai, supra note 42 ("Samsung is also looking to deploy the [SGR-A1]-minus the gun, but perhaps with some sort of nonlethal weapon-at airports, prisons, and nuclear power plants, among other places.").
paintball guns that can identify targets 2.5 miles away, warn targets to surrender, and fire at the target. 60 Even amateurs are producing armed robotic sentries. Robot enthusiasts today can build lethal robots with parts from Radio Shack and Best Buy for $600. 61 University students have built a robotic sentry armed with a pistol that is capable of tracking movement and heat. 62 The robot can fire its weapon either autonomously or by human prompting.
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Other university students have created robots with similar function, but did so using a Nerf gun and an iRobot Create. 64 This mobile robot can detect intruders and order them to surrender. 65 If the intruder does not surrender, the robot will autonomously fire its gun. 66 As a final example, a software engineer developed-and implemented in his backyard-an autonomous robot capable of both detecting squirrels and attacking them with a Super Soaker. 67 As robotic technology continues advancing, robotic sentries will be armed with legitimate weapons 68 such as firearms, rubber bullets, 69 or stun guns.
70 These sentries will no longer exist just in the battlefield and labs, but also in civilian factories, public places, and our homes. 71 In short, robotic sentries are in a position to become the next generation of self-defense weapons.
II. SECOND AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller held that the Second Amendment grants each person an individual right to possess arms. 72 The Heller Court further declared that arms are any weapon in common use for lawful purposes like self-defense. 73 Abstractly, arms can be viewed as both a subject matter and a limiting principle. The subject matter, weapons, is broad, 74 and the limiting principle-common use for self-defense-narrows that breadth.
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Under this framework, robotic weapons would be eligible for protection because they fit the broad definitional category; 76 they may soon be in common use for self-defense; 77 and they may be possessed for the purpose of self-defense.
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A. Subject Matter: Weapons
To be an arm, an object must be within the Second Amendment's subject matter: it must be a weapon. 79 Per Heller, a weapon is a "thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another." 80 Accordingly, weapons are more 71. See LIN, BEKEY & ABNEY, supra note 6, at 22 (stating that the future "may include robot sentries that guard not only military installations but also factories, government buildings, and the like"); see also Kumagai, supra note 42 (stating that Samsung is looking to deploy its robotic sentry "at airports, prisons, and nuclear power plants, among other places"); Thailand, supra note 62 (stating that their robotic sentry is "designed to provide security for museums and other public institutions"). That is, assuming they are not outlawed first. 85. See Wills, supra note 81, at 70 (stating that "'arms' in English, as in Latin, is not restricted to the meaning of 'guns'").
86. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (stating that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of founding" and declaring the argument that the Second Amendment only protects weapons that existed in the 18th century "bordering on the frivolous"); Volokh, supra note 83, at 218; Randy E. Barnett 88 People use robotic sentries to defend themselves and to strike others with bullets. With some robots, the person instructs the robot to strike another. With others, the robot may make the ultimate decision to strike, but the owner's penultimate decision enables the robot's strike. In essence, the owner's decision to employ the robot is an ex ante decision to strike another if the need arises-this should be sufficient to say that the person is using that robot to strike another.
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B. Limiting Principle: Common Use
The Second Amendment's subject matter, weapons, leaves a broad class of objects theoretically eligible for constitutional protection; the Amendment's limiting principle, common use, prunes that class. Common use requires that the weapon be "typically possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes like self-defense." 90 This definition amounts to two separate requirements: quantity and legitimacy. The weapon must be possessed by a sufficient quantity of people, 91 and it must be possessed for lawful reasons. Volokh, supra note 4, at 1479 (stating that it is not clear whether common use "requires that the typical possessor of the weapon be a law-abiding citizen with lawful purposes, or that possession of the weapon be a typical (that is, common) practice," but sensing that it is the former definition).
92. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 1292; Rostron, supra note 91, at 710-11; Gould, supra note 91, at 1555. first requirement because they are possessed by few; 93 bombs and missiles fail both because they are possessed by few and are not useful for self-defense. 95 it must not be "dangerous and unusual"; 96 and it must be wearable.
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This Subpart addresses two of these potential principles, and the following Part addresses the third.
The Heller Court declared that two categories of weapons are not arms: those that are "specifically designed for military use . . . [or] employed in a military capacity," 98 and those that are "dangerous and unusual." 99 The effect of these declarations remains unclear. Are these categories additional limiting principles that a weapon must satisfy to be an arm? Or, is common use the sole limiting principle, and these categories are examples of what usually is not in common use? This distinction is not trivial. If they are limiting principles and a robotic weapon is either (1) designed for or employed by the military, or (2) dangerous and unusual, then that weapon could not be an arm. But if common use is the sole limiting principle, that weapon could be an arm.
Most likely, common use is the sole limiting principle, and the categories of military use and dangerousness are examples of uncommon use, offered as an attempt to define common use in the negative. use is the only limiting principle; second, federal appellate courts indicated the same; and third, treating these two categories as additional limiting principles would yield illogical outcomes.
Heller indicated that common use is the only limiting principle. In discussing the limits of the Second Amendment, the Court listed only one limit on the types of weapons possessed: the common use test. 101 Additionally, in determining what weapons are arms, the Court applied only the common use test, not the categories of military use and dangerousness.
For example, in determining that the Second Amendment does not protect "ordinary military equipment" and machine guns, the Court explained its reasoning in terms of common use: "the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizen for lawful purposes."
102 Similarly, the Court concluded that the "weapons . . . most useful in military service, M-16 rifles and the like, may be banned" on the grounds that they are not in common use. 103 Finally, the Court indicated that the dangerousness category was not a separate limiting principle; rather, it instead "supported" the common use limiting principle. 104 Federal appellate courts confirm this reading of Heller.
105 They determine whether a weapon is an "arm" by applying the common use test to the weapon. weapon is used in the military or is dangerous and unusual. 107 In fact, two cases expressly endorse the reading that these categories are intended not as additional limiting principles, but instead as the antithesis of common use. 108 For example, the Eighth Circuit held that the Second Amendment does not protect machine guns because they "are not in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons." 109 Lastly, these two categories cannot be additional limiting principles because this would yield illogical outcomes. Some weapons may be in common use for self-defense, yet also be designed by or employed in the military. In such situations, Heller arguably indicates that common use is what matters, and the relevant weapon is an arm. Though not commenting directly on the matter, the Court recognized that muskets are arms because they were in common use, even though the Court also recognized that muskets were employed in a military capacity. 110 Similarly, the Court recognized handguns are arms because they are in common use for self-defense, 111 even though large-caliber revolvers, a that "the traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 'in common use at the time' for lawful purposes like self-defense" and that founding era men "would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia"); see also Kessler, 614 P.2d at 98 (finding that "[i]n the colonial and revolutionary war era, weapons used by militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one and the same," and concluding that "the term 'arms' as used by the drafters of the constitutions probably was intended to include those weapons used by settlers for both personal and military defense").
111. 14CNI1N (describing "the philosophy, design, and prototype implementation" of a system for overriding a machine's ethical controls).
124. See McKelvey, supra note 34 (reporting on an interview with Ronald Arkin, director of the Mobile Robot Lab at Georgia Tech, when Arkin explains that robots "will not have the full moral reasoning capabilities of humans [,] . . . but I believe they canand this is a hypothesis-perform better than humans"); see also LIN, BEKEY & ABNEY, supra note 6, at 53 (arguing that eventually robots should be able to perform at least as well as humans in legally using force); Boyd, supra note 53 (reporting that Intel Chief Technology Officer Justin Rattner has "said that it would take at least until 2050 to close the mental gap between people and machines"); cf. WENDELL WALLACH & COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 189-91 (2009) (discussing two noted scientists' prediction that "the advent of computer systems with intelligence programmed to comply and actually do comply with the laws of war, the same programmability and compliance should occur regarding the laws of self-defense.
III. LIMITING PRINCIPLE(?): WEARABILITY
Heller can be and has been interpreted as establishing another limiting principle, in addition to common use: arms must be wearable.
125
This interpretation is facially consistent with Heller. Under such an interpretation, most robotic weapons would not be arms, as they are too heavy or too cumbersome to carry in one's hands.
This Part argues that Heller is better interpreted as not requiring arms to be wearable, and it also argues that the Second Amendment should be similarly interpreted. This Part first explains the questionable origins of the wearability principle, within both Heller was an originalist opinion. The Court used originalismspecifically, original public meaning originalism-to interpret the Second Amendment. 135 Thus, when it defined bear, the Court looked to founding era dictionaries. 136 From these dictionaries, the Court concluded that bear means "carry"-just carry generally, not carry on the person-and that "bearing arms" means "carrying for a particular purpose[:] confrontation," whether offensive or defensive. 137 At no point during this discussion did the Court define bear to mean carrying upon the person.
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In an effort to support this definition gleaned from dictionaries, the 155 Finally, a recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case suggests that non-wearable weapons, like bombs and missiles, would be excluded on common use grounds rather than wearability grounds.
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Given this paucity of support, why have some scholars advanced the wearability principle? These arguments originated pre-Heller, in an era where the leading Supreme Court case on the Second Amendment-a five-page opinion written in 1939 157 -could "be read to support some of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments," such as a right to keep and bear bazookas, attack helicopters, and nuclear weapons. . Kerner adopted a definition of "arms" that is not tenable post-Heller. Kerner construed "arms" as being only those weapon in common use at the time of the Second Amendment's adopting. See Kerner, 107 S.E. at 224-25 (construing "arms" to include all weapons that "were in common use, and borne by the people as such when this provision was adopted"); cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (stating that "the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of founding" and declaring the argument that the Second Amendment only protects weapons that existed in the 18th century "bordering on the frivolous").
156. See United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that machine guns are not arms because they "are highly 'dangerous and unusual weapons' that are not 'typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes'" and that "bombs, missiles, and biochemical agents" are more dangerous than machine guns). 2000) ("Indeed, we extrapolate from the logic of Miller at our peril, because, under modern conditions, it would seem to grant the most constitutional protection to just those weapons that are least suitable to private possession-distinctly military 'arms' such as tanks, attack helicopters, rocket launchers, or even nuclear weapons."); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 1292 (stating that, pre-Heller, opponents to the individual rights interpretation argued arms included "tactical nuclear weapons and stinger missiles" to "undercut the individual rights view").
159. Kates, supra note 149, at 261.
But post-Heller, we need not such a limiting principle to exclude weapons of mass destruction. They are not, nor will they ever be, in common use, and they are not useful for self-defense.
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B. Incompatible with Heller
Courts should not read Heller as requiring arms to be wearable. The Court did not intend this result, as four aspects of Heller demonstrate.
Individual Right, Not Wearable Requirement
First, the main issue Heller addressed was whether the Second Amendment grants an individual right to possess arms or instead a right to possess arms only as part of a state-organized militia. 161 The Heller Court cited Muscarello to support its conclusion that the Second Amendment grants an individual right, not to establish a requirement that arms be wearable. 162 Heller's commentary immediately preceding its discussion of Muscarello illustrates this inference: "Although the phrase [bear arms] implies that the carrying of the weapon is for the purpose of 'offensive or defensive action,' it in no way connotes participation in a structured military organization." 163 Second, Heller never excluded a weapon from being an arm based on its lack of wearability. 164 In discussing why the "weapons . . . most useful in military service[,] M-16 rifles and the like[,] may be banned," the Court explained it was because these weapons were not in common use. 165 The Court's phrasing of weapons most useful in military service theoretically incorporates all such weapons, including non-wearable ones like tanks and bombs. Yet the Court did not exclude these weapons on wearability grounds. 165. Id. at 627 (stating that these weapons are "highly unusual in society at large" and that they are "the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty").
Core Right of Self-Defense
Third, Heller suggests it is not wearability that matters in determining what are arms, but rather it is whether the weapon is useful for self-defense.
Heller reasoned that the core of the Second Amendment was the right of armed self-defense. 166 For example, the Court describes self-defense as "central to the Second Amendment right;" 167 "the central component of the right itself;" 168 the Amendment's "core lawful purpose;"
169 an "inherent right;" 170 and as "surely elevate[d] above all other interests" when defending one's home. 171 Following the Court's lead, federal appellate courts have similarly found armed selfdefense to be the core of the right, 172 and so too scholars. 173 Heller indicated that this core right of self-defense should guide interpretations of the Second Amendment's scope, stating that "future evaluation[s]" of this scope must not only consider the self-defense purpose of the right, but "elevate [that purpose] above all other interests . . . ."
174 Accordingly, this self-defense purpose has guided courts and scholars' interpretations of the Second Amendment's scope, 175 and it should similarly guide the interpretation of whether arms must be wearable.
176 Thus, we should determine what weapons are arms not based on contrived principles relating to the weapon's physical attributes, but on functional principles: whether the weapon is useful for selfdefense, 177 and whether it enables a person to better defend herself than she could without it. 176. See Blocher, supra note 10, at 17 (stating that "'keep' and 'bear' must be interpreted in line with [Heller's] self-defense purpose"); see also Massey, supra note 8, at 1434-35 ("If we take the Second Amendment seriously, it secures an individual right to carry arms for self-defense, and the popular verdict on the arms that are utile for that purpose is surely as legitimate a source of constitutional construction as the musings of cloistered philosophers."); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Each new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed."). Since the Court has already divined the Amendment's purpose-self-defense-from the text's original public meaning, perhaps traditionally purpose-averse judges and justices will be more amenable to using that purpose to define arms.
177. See Massey, supra note 8, at 1434-35 ("If we take the Second Amendment seriously, it secures an individual right to carry arms for self-defense, and the popular verdict on the arms that are utile for that purpose is surely as legitimate a source of constitutional construction as the musings of cloistered philosophers."); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Second Amendment as a Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 889, 904-06 ("Sometimes, we should read a textual right more broadly Robotic weapons advance these functional principles of enabling self-defense. In fact, robots are better self-defense weapons than traditional firearms: robots are more accurate, react quicker, and never sleep. Furthermore, robots' superiority is especially true in modern society, where increasingly fewer people have chosen to own a gun. 179 In the past 40 years, gun ownership rates have declined roughly 30 percent, 180 now settling at roughly 25 percent. 181 For those who have chosen not to own firearms, about two-thirds view guns as "dangerous, 'immoral,' or otherwise objectionable." 182 Thus, in their calculus, many likely view owning a gun as more dangerous than not owning one. Perhaps this calculation would change with robotic weapons, as their risk of accidental injury or amoral use is less than that of firearms.
Another reality of modern society is that fewer people are skilled in using guns. Skilled marksmanship requires extensive practice, and it is unlikely that many gun owners achieve this level of competence. Though no empirical support exists for this belief, evidence suggests that the percentages of both people who own guns 183 and people who are experienced with guns 184 are declining. This lack of skill may make some people wary of or ineffective in using a gun for self-defense, thus further increasing the attraction of using robotic weapons.
Peripheral Pronouncement
Finally, the Court indicated that Heller's holding was limited to the core question addressed-the right to possess handguns in the homeand that other issues implicated by its holding require further examination, not deference. This limitation appears in the Court's justification of why it left "so many applications of the right . . . in doubt . . . ." 185 The Court explained that Heller "represents this Court's first indepth examination of the Second Amendment, [and] one should not expect it to clarify the entire field." 184. See Lindgren, supra note 181, at 2202 (stating that if we define "gun culture [as] mean [ing] growing up in households with guns, learning how to shoot them, widespread participation in military training where guns are used, and using guns as a tool (such as for vermin control), then we definitely had more of a gun culture in the eighteenth century than we do today").
185. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 186. Id. (continuing that "there will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us").
in an in-depth historical analysis of whether arms only include wearable weapons. 187 Further, the revolutionary nature of robotic weapons-the first weapon useful for self-defense that is not wearable-represents a new application of the Second Amendment that the Court did not consider.
C. Inconsistent with Originalist Interpretation
The Court in Heller did not intend to create a wearability requirement. 188 Nor should it create one in future cases. This requirement is not compelled by the Second Amendment's original public meaning, which is the interpretative theory that Heller and its progeny declared as controlling for analyzing novel Second Amendment questions. 189 Rather, the original public meaning is, at most, equivocal on the matter, with the better interpretation suggesting that weapons need not be wearable.
Linguistic Analysis
To ascertain the Second Amendment's original public meaning, I analyze the Founders' uses of the relevant text-the words "bear" and "arms"-and discern its meaning from the context its used. 190 Though this use occurs several years post-founding, it arguably is still relevant to an original public meaning inquiry, as this era's understanding is likely to be similar to the founder's understanding. 198 Some have argued that the linguistic meaning of bear arms was a "distinctly military phrase" that did not, "in the strictest sense," apply to 191 . For an examination of the many ways that "bear" was used at founding, see generally Cramer & Olson, supra note 83; see also Barnett, supra This argument does not meaningfully alter the linguistic analysis. Assuming it is true, the inquiry narrows the corpus from all uses of bearing arms to only those in the context of the military. The core question remains essentially the same: would a cavalryman carrying his rifle in a scabbard slung on his horse be bearing arms? The answer remains equivocal.
I next examine the usage of the word arms. With each use of the word, I ask whether it includes or excludes non-wearable weapons. This examination reveals four patterns of uses. First are the equivocal uses, which indicate nothing on this question. A notable example comes from Patrick Henry: "The great object is that every man be armed." 200 Similarly, Thomas Jefferson wrote that "[n]o freeman shall ever be debarred the use of arms." 201 Numerous other examples are listed in the Appendix. 202 Common to all these examples is that the usage of arms or armed sheds no light on whether arms include or exclude non-wearable weapons.
Second are the uses suggesting that arms are only muskets, excluding even pistols and rifles. 203 This usage cannot be the meaning ascribed to the Second Amendment; Heller explicitly disavowed it. 204 Third are the uses indicating that arms include only wearable weapons. Several Founders used the word in such a manner. 205 For example, John Adams wrote of "arms in the hands of citizens. . . ." 206 Finally, the fourth use indicates that arms include both wearable and non-wearable weapons. For instance, James Madison and others used arms in a manner inclusive of all military weaponry, including nonwearable artillery. 207 Additionally, historian Garry Wills has argued that "arms" meant all weaponry, irrespective of whether it is wearable. 208 a. Translating the Linguistic Meaning As already discussed, one plausible original meaning of the Second Amendment was that it protects wearable arms only. But the Amendment may have obtained that meaning not because the weapons were wearable, but because they were the only weapons useful for selfdefense. 209 We should use that purpose or reason behind the original meaning to "translate" it into a legal meaning. 210 Such translations often occur when applying the Constitution to technological advancements. 211 For example, it is doubtful that the original public meaning of "speech" in the First Amendment included video games, but its original purpose was protecting expression, of which video games are a form. 212 Thus, the First Amendment protects video games because they are a form of expression, not because the original public meaning of speech included video games. 213 Like the First Amendment, the Second Amendment's original meaning needs translating. The alleged meaning that arms must be wearable is tainted by the technology of the time: the Second Amendment's purpose was to protect a right of self-defense, and to that end, non-wearable weapons were near useless. Thus, the original meaning that arms must be wearable may have been born of this technological limitation. Now, non-wearable weapons are useful for self-defense, and we must translate that original meaning to its legal meaning today. The proper translation is guided by the original meaning's rationale. Accordingly, the modern legal meaning should define arms not by whether they are wearable, but by whether they are useful for selfdefense.
D. Imprudent
Requiring arms to be wearable is imprudent, as it categorically excludes weapons that are potentially safer than firearms. Without robotic weapons, firearms will continue to cause accidental and unnecessary injuries and deaths. 214 Employing robots for self-defense could reduce this number. Robots can be programmed to minimize the possibility of misuse, to prevent accidents, and to shoot to incapacitate, not to kill. Further, they could be armed with nonlethal weapons, such as rubber bullets. 215 This is not to say that robotic weapons will never misfire. Accidents have occurred, and they will continue to occur. In 2007, for example, a "semiautonomous robotic cannon deployed by the South African army malfunctioned, killing 9 soldiers and wounding 14 others. . . ." 216 Nonetheless, it seems likely that the risk of accidental harm from a robot malfunctioning is less than that of a person erring with a firearm, 217 especially when considering that each iteration of robotic weapons reduces the risk of malfunction.
On a final note, some may question whether Heller forecloses using prudential arguments to define arms. 218 Though recognizing "the problem of handgun violence in this country," 219 Heller declared this problem irrelevant to interpreting the Second Amendment. 220 In spite of this, prudential arguments may still play a role in interpreting the Second Amendment.
Heller rejected prudential arguments because they could not compel an interpretation wholly incompatible with the right of armed self-defense-an interpretation that would strip people of the right to own handguns, the preferred selfdefense weapon. But perhaps prudence can corroborate an interpretation compatible with this right. 221 the Second Amendment provides the right to range training, even though it is neither an arm nor part of the Amendment's core right. 230 In effect, the court reasoned that the core right "implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use . . . ." 231 Not recognizing this "corresponding right," or auxiliary right, would vitiate the core right.
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Ezell thus demonstrates that recognizing an auxiliary right for an activity or object requires that it further one's ability to exercise the core right of self-defense. 233 The activity or object need not be essential-one does not need firearm range training to defend oneself with a firearmbut it should at least be reasonably necessary.
Perhaps certain robots can satisfy this necessity requirement for auxiliary rights.
For example, robots that employ an already constitutionally protected weapon, such as a 9mm pistol located in a bedroom dresser. Here, an auxiliary right would be grounded on modern people's incompetency with guns, which effectively deprives them of their right of armed self-defense. 234 In essence, it would be an auxiliary right to employ an armed bodyguard, whether human or mechanical.
Courts have not opined on the merits of an auxiliary right to employ a bodyguard. But some evidence suggests that such a right exists. Notably, a federal statute prohibits convicted felons from owning firearms, 235 and federal courts have interpreted it as also barring them from employing armed bodyguards who operate under the felon's control. 236 Felons have limited, if any, Second Amendment rights. 237 Thus, it does not violate their Second Amendment right when Congress bans them from owning firearms. But to make this ban effective-to fully curb their right to arms-Congress must not only strip firearms from their possession but also "strip[] firearms from their control." 238 Perhaps the inverse of this reasoning suggests that law-abiding citizens with full Second Amendment rights have the right to both possess and control weapons, which includes the right to employ a bodyguard operating under the person's control.
V. CONCLUSION
None of this article proves that robots are arms, or even that they will be arms. This article does not intend to prove such things. Rather, it intends to ignite a discussion on this very real question 239 by demonstrating the very real possibility of robots being arms under current Second Amendment doctrine.
We should not be afraid of this possibility. Robots will change, and are changing, how our society functions at a fundamental level. Autonomous cars, for instance, remove the person from the driver's seat, a position where he has resided for over 100 years. These cars already drive through our streets, 240 and some states are updating their licensing laws accordingly. 241 Many expect these autonomous cars to improve automobile safety dramatically. 242 Robotic weapons are on a similar cusp as autonomous cars. We should react to this innovation not by banning them, but by examining methods to make them safer. For example, maybe production should be regulated to ensure the robots are sufficiently discriminating and pose little risk of malfunction.
243
Robotic weapons have the potential to become America's new preferred self-defense weapon. 244 If that occurs, Heller suggests they are arms and entitled to constitutional protection, and nothing in the Second Amendment's history forecloses that reading.
Single Accident Under Computer Control, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 9, 2012, 12:29 PM), http://bit.ly/MC544k. 243. Cf. Calo, supra note 30, at 608-09, 609 n.253. Nevada regulates autonomous cars in a similar manner. See Autonomous Vehicles, supra note 241 ("Manufacturers, software developers and others interested in testing their vehicles in Nevada must submit an application to the Department along with proof that one or more of your autonomous vehicles have been driven for a combined minimum of at least 10,000 miles, a complete description of your autonomous technology, a detailed safety plan, and your plan for hiring and training your test drivers.").
244. Cf. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624, 629 (finding handguns protected by the Second Amendment because they are "the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for selfdefense in the home").
defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing game. . . ."
250
Ratification of the Constitution by the State of Virginia: "That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his stead." 251 Thomas Jefferson: "If, then, France has invaded Spain, an insurrection immediately takes place in Paris, the Royal family is sent to the Temple, then perhaps to the Guillotine; to the 2 or 300,000 men able to bear arms in Paris will flock all the young men of the nation." 252 James Madison: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in person." 253 Thomas Pownall: "Let therefore every man, that, appealing to his own heart, feels the least spark of virtue or freedom there, think that it is an honour which he owes himself, and a duty which he owes his country, to bear arms." 254 Williamsburgh, Massachusetts, citizens: "Voted that these words their Own be inserted which makes it read thus; that the people have a right to keep and to bear Arms for their Own and the Common defence." 255 
